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8 9 10 11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION			
12 13 14	Darley International, LLC, a Delaware) CASE NO. CV 08-05034 DDP (PLAx) corporation, PETITIONER DARLEY Petitioner,) INTERNATIONAL, LLC'S REPLY			
14 15 16	vs. South Dakota International Business Institute, a non-Profit organization) MEMO) PETITI	RANDUM IN ON FOR OF ELLING AR JANT TO WI	I SUPPORT OF
17 18	Respondent.	[9 U.S.C. § 4]		
19) Date:) Time:) Place:	Septem 10:00 a Courtro	ber 15, 2008 .m. om 3
20 21	Hon. Dean D. Pregerson			
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1 I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent South Dakota International Business Institute ("SDIBI" or
"Respondent") opposes Petitioner Darley International, LLC's ("Darley" or
"Petitioner") petition for order compelling arbitration pursuant to a written
agreement based on erroneous legal arguments as to why it is not bound
by the arbitration clause contained in the disputed Agreement.
Respondent also claims that it is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of

8 this Court.

As discussed below, SDIBI's opposing papers are replete with 9 conclusory and misleading statements concerning the obligations of 10 nonsignatories. Throughout its opposition, SDIBI fails to city any authority 11 for many of its assertions. In an effort to detract from the real question 12 before the Court, Respondent attempts to argue the merits of Petitioner's 13 claims. The only issue before the Court is whether SDIBI is bound by the 14 arbitration clause contained the disputed Overseas Recruitment Agreement 15 ("Agreement") entered into by Darley and Hanul Professional Law 16 Corporation ("Hanul"). Darley's petition, moving papers and 17 accompanying declarations and exhibits present evidence that support the 18 notion that SDIBI should be compelled to join the pending arbitration 19 20 between Petitioner Darley and Hanul Professional Law Corporation ("Hanul"). 21

- 22 II. <u>ARGUMENT</u>
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A. This Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant

SDIBI contends that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in
California because it is not domiciled in California, has not consented to
jurisdiction and does not have "minimum contacts" with the forum state. As
discussed below, SDIBI maintains the requisite "minimum contacts" with

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California to support a finding that it is subject to the specific, and likely
 general, jurisdiction of this Court.

In a diversity action, such as this, the Court establishes the existence
of personal jurisdiction by applying the California long-arm statute, which is
coextensive with federal constitutional standards. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 410.10 ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.");
Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

9 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible so 10 long as (1) a nonresident defendant has "minimum contacts" with the 11 forum, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in that it "does not 12 offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International 13 <u>Shoe Co. v. Washington</u>, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) 14 (citation omitted); accord Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 268, 15 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002). Personal jurisdiction may be either general 16 or specific. 17

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1. SDIBI Is Subject to This Court's Specific Jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction exists where: (1) the nonresident defendant 19 purposely availed itself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or 20arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) the exercise of 21 personal jurisdiction must be reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 22 471 U.S. 462, 472-76, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182-84 (1985); Helicopteros 23 Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8, 104 S. Ct. 24 1868, 1872 & n.8 (1984); accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 25 Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980); Roth v. Garcia 26 Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991). 27

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a. Purposeful Availment

SDIBI's opposing papers provide evidence demonstrating that it has 2 purposefully directed activities at Hanul, a California resident, and has 3 derived significant benefits from doing so. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 4 472-76, 105 S. Ct. at 2182-84; Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 5 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (so long as defendant's efforts were 6 "purposefully directed" toward a forum resident, the nonresident defendant 7 need not have been physically present or have had physical contact with 8 the forum state (citing <u>Ballard v. Savage</u>, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 9 1995)). Significantly, SDIBI granted Hanul the exclusive right to market 10 SDIBI's EB-5 projects and appoint independent contractors to do the 11 same.¹ Respondent readily admits that all inquiries related to recruiting 12 Asian investors for SDIBI's projects are forwarded directly to Hanul. (Opp. 13 at 7.) SDIBI further admits that Hanul's recruitment efforts have helped to 14 15 result in the success of 12 dairy projects. (*Id.*)

As further proof of SDIBI's deliberate contact with California, one 16 need only look at SDIBI's website, which not only provides a direct link to 17 Hanul's website, but states: "SDIBI, in collaboration with Hanul 18 Professional Law Corporation has unique access to Regional Center 19 20Immigrant Visas (green cards)!!!" (Declaration of Jennifer S. Elkayam ("Elkayam Decl."), filed concurrently, Exh. 1.) Similarly, Hanul promotes its 21 ability to offer EB-5 investment opportunities, on an exclusive basis, in 22 South Dakota. (Id., Exh. 2.) Hanul and SDIBI appear to have an agency 23 type relationship in that Hanul has the exclusive right to market and 24 promote SDIBI's EB-5 projects in Asia. 25

¹ As set forth in section 1(A) of the disputed Agreement, Hanul's exclusive rights to market SDIBI's EB-5 projects are unofficial "[b]ecause State of South Dakota is prohibited from granting exclusive rights to private entities in regards to SDIBI EB-5 Projects."

Significantly, many California courts have found that principles of 1 agency can establish a basis for specific personal jurisdiction. VirtualMagic 2 Asia, Inc. v. Fil-Cartoons, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 228, 244-46, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3 2d 1 (2002) (principles of alter eqo and agency can establish a basis for 4 specific personal jurisdiction); Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., 209 Cal. 5 App. 3d 526, 535-39, 257 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1989) (applied state law of 6 agency in finding specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation); Vons Cos. 7 v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 434, 459 n.7, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 8 (1996) (stated in dictum, "corporate veils may be pierced and agents" 9 activities may be considered in appropriate cases"). 10

For these reasons it is clear that SDIBI's relationship with Hanulconstitutes purposeful availment in California.

b. <u>Darley's Claims Arise Out of and Relate to</u> <u>SDIBI's Forum-Related Activities</u>

Darley's claims are substantially connected to SDIBI's business 15 relationship with Hanul. See <u>Cornelison v. Chaney</u>, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 149, 16 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (a controversy is related to or arises out of the 17 defendant's forum contacts as long as the claim bears a substantial 18 connection to the nonresident's forum contacts); see also Vons, 14 Cal. 4th 19 20 at 452. In the subject Agreement, Hanul appointed Darley as an independent contractor to recruit investors solely for SDIBI's EB-5 projects 21 in specific territories. The subject Agreement is based on Hanul's right to 22 grant exclusive marketing rights of SDIBI's projects. But for SDIBI's 23 contacts with California, Darley's claims would not have arisen. See 24 25 <u>Ballard v. Savage</u>, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995); <u>Vons</u>, 14 Cal. 4th at 452 (claim need not arise directly from defendant's forum contacts in order 26 to be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific 27 jurisdiction). 28

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c. <u>Reasonableness</u>

Where, as here, Respondent SDIBI's minimum contacts have been
established, the Court is required to presume that personal jurisdiction over
Respondent is reasonable (see Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1500), and the burden
shifts to Respondent to "present a compelling case that the presence of
some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable' in order
to defeat personal jurisdiction" (Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 114 (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S. Ct. at 2185)).

9 The Ninth Circuit has set out seven factors to ensure personal jurisdiction is "reasonable" and comports with "fair play and substantial 10 justice": "(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection [into the 11 forum state's affairs]; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the 12 forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's 13 state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most 14 efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the 15 forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the 16 existence of an alternative forum." Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1323. 17 Courts must balance the factors and no single factor is dispositive. *Id.* 18

19 Applying these factors to the case, Respondent cannot possibly 20overcome the presumption that personal jurisdiction is reasonable. Respondent chose to inject itself into California by doing business with and 21 maintaining an ongoing relationship with Hanul. Nor can Respondent 22 possibly show that it would be seriously burdened by litigating the issue of 23 arbitration in California. The Ninth Circuit has consistently refused to allow 24 25 foreign defendants with demonstrable minimum contacts to escape jurisdiction by claiming undue burden. Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1115; Roth, 26 942 F.2d at 623; Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1501. 27

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The remaining factors either balance in favor of litigating in California 1 or are neutral as between California and South Dakota. Petitioner is a 2 California corporation alleging that it was injured by SDIBI and Hanul based 3 on an Agreement entered into in this forum. As alleged in the petition, 4 5 SDIBI played a significant role in negotiating the disputed Agreement. It is unquestionably more efficient and convenient for Petitioner to bring its 6 petition to compel arbitration in the same state where the arbitration 7 between Darley and Hanul is currently pending. 2. 8

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SDIBI Is Likely Subject to This Court's General Jurisdiction

A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant where its 10 contacts in the forum state are "substantial. . .continuous and systematic" 11 even if the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's business 12 relationship with the forum. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 13 U.S. 437, 445-46, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418 (1952); see also <u>Helicopteros</u> 14 Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414-15,104 S. Ct. at 1872; Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d 15 at 147. Based upon information available in the public record and the 16 carefully culled disclosures in Respondent's opposing papers, it would 17 appear that Respondent has systematic and continuous contacts with 18 California. 19

20 Since at least 2004, SDIBI and Hanul have worked collaboratively to recruit investors for SDIBI's EB-5 projects. (Opp. at 6-7.) Hanul locates 21 Asian investors for SDIBI projects and, in return receives the business and 22 legal fees associated with completing all paperwork related to the 23 recruitment and green card petitions. SDIBI has maintained systematic 24 25 and continuous contact with California based on its relationship with Hanul. When Robert Stratmore, Darley's president, contacted SDIBI about 26 recruiting investors, SDIBI forwarded the inquiry directly to Hanul. 27 Although this does not likely answer the full nature of SDIBI's business 28

activities in California, and in the unlikely event that this Court finds specific
 jurisdiction lacking, Darley respectfully requests the opportunity to engage
 in limited discovery on the issue of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., <u>GTE</u>
 <u>New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.</u>, 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir.
 2000) (jurisdictional discovery appropriate if court makes preliminary
 determination jurisdiction is lacking).

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B. <u>Venue Is Proper in the Central District of California</u>

8 The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that a civil
9 action wherein federal jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity of
10 citizenship may be brought only in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if 11 all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a 12 judicial district in which a substantial part of the 13 events or omissions giving rise to the claim 14 occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 15 subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial 16 district in which any defendant is subject to personal 17 jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if 18 there is no district in which the action may otherwise 19 20 be brought.

21 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Petitioner's choice of venue is proper since it satisfies subsection (1)
in that "a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). As discussed above, SDIBI's
business relationship with Hanul, a Los Angeles-based law firm, satisfies
the minimum contacts test subjecting SDIBI to personal jurisdiction in this

district. Darley's choice of venue also satisfies subsection (2) as its claims
 arise from an agreement drafted and negotiated in California.

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C. <u>SDIBI Is Clearly a Third-Party Beneficiary to the Agreement</u>

4 Despite SDIBI's contentions otherwise, the intent to confer a direct
5 benefit on SDIBI is inherent in the language of the Agreement. The clear
6 purpose of the Agreement was to attract foreign nationals to invest in
7 SDIBI's approved EB-5 projects. Under the Agreement, Hanul appointed
8 Darley for exactly this purpose.

As further proof of SDIBI's status as a third-party beneficiary, one 9 need only look to the declaration of Joop Bollen, SDIBI's director. 10 Paragraph 20 explains that with respect to the disputed Agreement, SDIBI 11 provided information to Hanul and Darley "with the hope that they would 12 guickly start recruiting investors for South Dakota's benefit." Clearly, SDIBI 13 was aware of the parties intent to confer a direct benefit upon SDIBI in 14 15 performing their obligations under the Agreement. Accordingly, SDIBI was more than an indirect beneficiary and should be subject to the pending 16 arbitration. 17

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D. SDIBI Is Bound by Direct Benefits Estoppel

Under direct benefits estoppel, a company that "knowingly accepted" 19 20the benefits" of an agreement with an arbitration clause, even without signing the agreement, may be bound by the arbitration clause. <u>Deloitte</u> 21 <u>Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells</u>, 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993); 22 MAG Portfolio Consult, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group, LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 23 61 (2d Cir. 2001). So long as the nonsignatory receives a direct benefit 24 25 flowing from the underlying agreement, it can be bound by its terms. <u>Deloitte Noraudit</u>, for example, concerned an agreement containing an 26 arbitration clause which governed the terms of use of a trade name. The 27 court found that a nonsignatory who had received a copy of the agreement, 28

raised no objections to it and made use of the trade name pursuant to the
 agreement was estopped from arguing it was not bound by the arbitration
 clause in the agreement. 9 F.3d at 1064.

In the instant case, SDIBI was not only made aware of the
recruitment contract between Darley and Hanul, but participated in
negotiating the terms relating to Darley's exclusivity rights in certain
territories. SDIBI received the direct benefits of the seminars conducted by
Darley in China as they were held specifically to recruit investors for
SDIBI's projects. Darley's performance obligations under the Agreement
all resulted in benefits flowing directly and purposefully to SDIBI.

Ε. **SDIBI Is Required to Arbitrate Under Principles of Agency** 11 SDIBI contends that it does not have the type of intimate relationship 12 with Hanul to constitute agency and is not bound to the Agreement under 13 this principle. The existence of agency, however, is mainly a question of 14 fact. 3 B. E. Witkin, Summary of California Law § 93 (10th ed. 2005). "An 15 agency may be created, and an authority may be conferred, by a precedent 16 authorization or a subsequent ratification." Cal. Civ. Code § 2307. SDIBI's 17 own statements about its working relationship with Hanul and Hanul's 18 "unofficial" exclusive right to market and promote SDIBI's projects 19 20contradicts the notion that Hanul lacks authority to act on its behalf.

On one hand, SDIBI's makes clear that Hanul has the right to market 21 and promote its projects and authority to grant exclusive marketing rights to 22 independent contractors. (Opp. at 7.) SDIBI honors Hanul's rights by 23 forwarding all inquiries related to recruiting Asian investors to Hanul. (Id.) 24 25 On the other hand, SDIBI claims that Hanul is not an agent of SDIBI because it has not expressly consented to Hanul acting on its behalf. (Id. 26 at 17.) This argument is flawed for several reasons. First, agency can be 27 either actual or ostensible. Cal. Civ. Code § 2298. The relationship 28

between SDIBI and Hanul shows that Hanul, at the very least, had 1 2 ostensible authority to act for SDIBI's benefit with respect to recruiting investors. See Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533 3 (1946). Second, the disputed Agreement reveals SDIBI has granted Hanul 4 5 the right to recruit investors for its projects and the authority to grant exclusive marketing rights to independent contractors. (Petition, Exh. 1 at 6 1.) Specifically, the Agreement provides that Hanul's appointment of 7 Darley relies on SDIBI honoring Hanul's unofficial exclusive rights to 8 market SDIBI's EB-5 projects. The facts demonstrate that, at the very 9 least, Hanul has ostensible authority to act on SDIBI's behalf. 10

Based on the extensive facts harnessed by Petitioner thus far, and
Respondent's failure to provide anything other than brief and conclusory
declarations, this Court can certainly find that an agency relationship
between Hanul and SDIBI existed. Alternatively, Petitioner should be
permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery on this issue should the Court
be unable to determine whether an agency relationship existed.

17 III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For all the foregoing reasons, Darley's petition for order compelling
SDIBI to join the ongoing arbitration between Hanul and Darley should be
granted. If this Court finds that specific jurisdiction is lacking, Petitioner
respectfully requests the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to
determine if this Court has general jurisdiction over Respondent.

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23 Dated: September 8, 2008

BLECHER & COLLINS, P.C.

Bv Ikayam Attorneys for Petitioner DARLEY INTERNATIONAL, LLC

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